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THANKS FOR NOT SUING: THE PROSPECTS
FOR STATE COURT CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION OVER TOBACCO INJURIES
Mark C. Weber*
One of the most important elements of the congressional proposal
to settle the state attorneys' general tobacco litigation was the bar
to class action lawsuits brought by smokers against the tobacco

industry. With the collapse of the original settlement and its
replacement by an agreement that encompasses only the claims by

the states,' class action tobacco litigation2 has reappeared on the
horizon---or even in the foreground-in many locales.'
Big money is riding on class action lawsuits over tobacco use.
Just as one indication, a year ago the tobacco companies were
willing to pay $368.5 billion and accepted up to $2 billion in annual
penalties for failing to reduce youth smoking in order to get a deal
with the states that would have shielded them from class action
liability and punitive damages. 4 Their recent agreement to settle for

$206 billion without obtaining those protections5 suggests that they
believe the combination of class action liability and exposure to
punitive damages is worth at least $162.5 billion plus whatever
. Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A. 1975, Columbia; J.D. 1978, Yale. I thank
the participants in a DePaul College of Law faculty workshop for their help in developing the
ideas in this paper, and my colleagues, Mary Becker, Patrick Hughes, Mary Kate Kearney,
Stephen Landsman, and Stephen Siegel, for reading an early draft. Thanks also to Janet
Brewer and Victoria Napolitano for their research assistance.
See Barry Meier, CigaretteMakers and States Draft a $206 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1998, at Al (describing draft agreement to settle claims of 46 states that have not
yet settled suits over Medicaid costs of treating people with smoking-related illnesses).
2 See id. ("Unlike the earlier state proposal, this new plan does not shield tobacco
companies from punitive damages and class-action liability suits.").
' See infra text accompanying notes 117-120 (discussing extant cases).
4 See Meier, supra note 1, at Al (noting settlement would have provided marketing
restrictions and federal regulation of nicotine in exchange for protections against some
smoking-related lawsuits). These restrictions would have required congressional approval.
When Congress raised the amounts the companies had to pay, they balked and support for
the arrangement crumbled. See id. (stating industry opposition defeated settlement after
$516 billion tobacco bill was proposed in Congress).
' See id. (noting tobacco companies would still be subject to lawsuits from parties other
than states participating in settlement).
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value the risk of the annual penalties or loss of youth markets is
worth.
Beyond the money is the human loss from smoking. Public
health experts estimate that tobacco kills over 400,000 Americans
a year,6 the equivalent of three jumbo jet crashes every day.7 The
tort system may not be the only social intervention that can address
the dangers of smoking8 but it does provide the prospect of compensation to victims and incentives to manufacturers either to invent
safer cigarettes or to diminish production. Litigation, however, is
chancy and expensive. Persons injured by exposure to tobacco may
find class action procedures the best mechanism to cope with the
risk and share the costs.
Current scholarship has addressed the use of the class action and
similar devices in litigation over harmful products, but the work has
focused on the federal class action rule and class action litigation in
the federal courts.' For reasons this Article seeks to make clear,
federal class action litigation over tobacco exposure is unlikely to be
6 STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 436 (1996).

7 Kathryn M. Doolan & Robert A. Indeglia, Jr., A Call for Action: The Burning Issue of
Smoking in the Workplace, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 221, 222 (1989); see also JOHN
ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 94-98
(making statistical comparison of smoking-related deaths to other health and safety risks).
' Various commentary addresses regulatory options for tobacco. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson
et al., Smokers' Compensation: Toward a Blueprint for FederalRegulation of Cigarette
Manufacturers,22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 519 (1998); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of
Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163
(1998); Lars Noah, RegulatingCigarettes: (Non)sense and Sensibility, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 677
(1998); James T. O'Reilly, Tobaccoand the RegulatoryEarthquake. Why the FDA WillPrevail
After the Smoke Clears, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 509 (1997); Phillip Rohde Costello, Note, Put This
in Your Pipeand Smoke It: FDA Regulation of Tobacco Products,41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 703
(1997).
' See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Rule 23Redu="Empoweringthe FederalClassAction, 14 REV.
LITIG. 79, 87, 104-05 (1994) (noting impact Federal Rule 23 could have in expanding use of
class actions in mass tort litigation); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort
Case: A Proposed FederalProcedureAct, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1986) (proposing separate
federal statute for mass tort class actions); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts:
DoingIndividualJusticeby CollectiveMeans,62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) (asserting that mass tort
class actions are more likely to achieve individual justice than traditional, disaggregated tort
litigation); Roger H. Trangsrud, JoinderAlternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELLL.
REV. 779 (1985) (examining alternatives tojoinderin mass tort litigation); Georgene M. Vairo,
Georgine, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Torts Claims
Resolution, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79 (1997) (asserting that Dalkon Shield Trust experience
demonstrates practicality and fairness of aggregated resolution of mass tort claims in federal
courts).
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successful. State court class action litigation, on the other hand,
appears both possible and, if certain restrictions are imposed on its
use, desirable as a matter of judicial policy. This Article probes the
use of state court class action litigation over tobacco exposure. The
state attorneys' general settlement, by not foreclosing the use of
class suits, makes the inquiry a pressing one.
Part I of this Article discusses the use of federal class procedures
to redress tobacco injuries, taking up recent cases that cast doubt on
the propriety of the federal class action for that purpose. Part II
maps the use of state class action procedure, suggesting that the
state class action avoids the problems noted by the federal courts
and should, in many instances, surmount difficulties posed by state
procedural rules and by legal doctrines relating to jurisdiction,
choice of law, and class definition. Part III contemplates the
desirability of state class action litigation in light of policy concerns,
taking up economics, participation rights, fairness to defendants,
and the propriety of having state decisionmakers determine the
content of the tort law that relates to tobacco injuries.
I. BARRIERS TO THE USE OF THE FEDERAL CLASS ACTION
TO REDRESS TOBACCO-RELATED INJURIES
Several recent developments make class action suits over
tobacco-related injuries unlikely to be successful if filed in the
federal courts. One is the appellate reversal of the certification of
a nationwide class of persons injured by tobacco products.' 0 The
court in that case articulated a number of objections to proceeding
as a class under the Federal Rules and other standards applicable
to the federal courts." Another is the Supreme Court's reversal of
a settlement of a nationwide class of persons injured by asbestos. 2
The Court there also interpreted the federal class action rule in a
way likely to make the federal courts inhospitable to class claims for
13
damages for product injuries.

See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
'See infra Section L.A. (discussing Castano).

£2

See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).

' See infra Section I.B. (discussing Amchem).
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A. CASTANO

In Castanov. American Tobacco Co., 4 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court's certification of a nationwide
class embracing all nicotine-dependent persons who had purchased
and smoked cigarettes since 1943 as well as their estates, and their
spouses, their children, and other people connected to them.1 5
According to the court of appeals, the "gravamen of [plaintiffs']
complaint is the novel and wholly untested theory that the defendants fraudulently failed to inform consumers that nicotine is
addictive and manipulated the level of nicotine in cigarettes to
sustain their addictive nature."'6 The certification extended only to
"core" issues: factual determinations "whether defendants knew
cigarette smoking was addictive, failed to inform cigarette smokers
of such, and took actions to addict cigarette smokers."
Legal
claims common to the class that arose from these factual matters
included fraud, negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, and
violation of consumer protection laws."8 The trial court did not
certify the class as to matters of compensatory damages, nor issues
specific to particular class members, such as injury-in-fact, proximate cause, reliance or affirmative defenses. 9 It did, however,
certify the class concerning questions related to punitive damages
and adopted a plan to have the jury determine a ratio of punitive
damages to actual damages if it found punitive damages appropriate.20
The court of appeals reversed certification on three grounds: (1)
that the district court failed to give adequate consideration to how
21
variations in state law affect the predominance of common issues
84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 740.
Is Id. at 737.
" Id. at 739 (quoting Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 553 (E.D. La.
1995), revd, 84 F.3d 737 (5th Cir. 1996)).
14

'5

Is Id.

'9 Id. at 740.
'o See id. C'[Class jury would develop a ratio of punitive damages to actual damages,
and the court would apply that ratio in individual cases.").
21 See id. at 741-44 (stating that district court relied on consumer fraud and punitive
damages surveys provided by plaintiffs and failed to "critically analyze[ how variations in
state law would affect predominance"). The court further stated that the district court failed

1999]

TOBACCO INJURIES

983

(predominance of common issues being one of the requirements of
a class action for damages relief when there is no limited fund of
assets that is being contested);2 2 (2) that the predominance inquiry
that was conducted failed to consider how to conduct a trial on the
merits; 23 and (3) that for a tort with an inadequate record of
adjudication, class proceedings do not meet the requirement for
class actions for damages (not involving a limited fund of assets)2 4
that a class action be the superior method of handling the case.2 5
The court's list of the variations in state law included such issues
as the need to establish justifiable, as opposed to reasonable,
reliance for a fraud claim; the ability to employ strict liability, and
which variation of strict liability, for the defective-product claim; the
applicability of assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery, or
of comparative negligence as a partial bar, and which form of
comparative negligence-pure or modified, and if modified, equal
fault or greater fault; and the existence of a negligent infliction of
emotional distress cause of action, and if one does exist, whether a
physical impact is required. 6 Because the federal court lacks the
ability to control the content of governing law but must follow state
law under the doctrine of Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins,2 7 a district
court would have to make "Erieguesses '28 about each of these issues
for every state whose law would control. The court declared that the

to determine whether the class action would be manageable in light of the potential variations
in state law. Id. at 743-44.
" See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (setting forth prerequisite that "questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members").
2
See Castano, 84 F.3d at 744.46 ("The district court... failed to consider how the
plaintiffs' addiction claims would be tried, individually or on a class basis.").
24 See FED. R. CIV.P. 23(b)(3) (providing that court must find "that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy").
Like the predominance standard, this requirement applies only to class actions brought under
subdivision (b)(3), which are generally those actions for damages relief that do not involve a
common fund. Id.
2
See Castano,84 F.3d at 746-51 ("[Clertification ofan immature tort results in a higher
than normal risk that the class action may not be superior to individual adjudication.").
2 See id. at 742-43 n.15 (listing issues that make finding predominance difficult due to
variations in state law).
27 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that state law, instead of 'federal general common
law," should be applied '[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress").
28 Castano, 84 F.3d at 747.
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reliance issue, particularly the need to prove individual reliance for
the fraud claim, further justified reversal of the certification, for the
district court failed to consider the likelihood that the need to show
individual reliance on the misrepresentations would necessitate
individual trials.2 9
The class also failed the test of superiority, according to the court
of appeals, 0 and did so for a number of reasons. First, the massing
of claims in a class action would create too high a prospective
recovery, even if the risk of liability were low, for the defendants to
resist settling.3 ' Second, the number of filings over tobacco exposure
so far has failed to demonstrate great judicial economy benefits from
having a single proceeding;"2 any such benefits might be illusory
anyway, given the likelihood that individual trials on comparative
negligence and reliance would be needed, 3 and that differences of
34
state law would make a common-issues trial unmanageable.
Third, economic considerations for plaintiffs do not necessitate a
class action, according to the court.3 5 The size of prospective awards
makes contingent-fee financing possible, and a consortium of
plaintiff lawyers could mass resources against the defendants;36
consolidation of cases for pretrial matters might save some costs as

' See id. at 744-45 (indicating that district court failed to decide whether reliance would
have to be proven at individual trials based upon erroneous belief that court is limited to the
pleadings when deciding certification).
3o

Id. at 746.

See id. at 746-47 ('The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk,
even when the probability of an adverse judgment is low. These settlements have been
referred to as judicial blackmail." (internal citation omitted)).
'
See id. at 747-48 (finding district court's belief that"judicial crisis" would result from
millions of potential individual trials was "pure speculation").
' See id. at 749 (noting "a waste, not a savings in judicial resources" could result
because of repetition of evidence at individual trials or possible decertification after years of
litigation).
'
See id. at 749-50 (indicating that plaintiffs' multiple theories of liability make class
treatment more complicated). In this connection, the court noted the desirability of having
the state courts develop their own law. See id. at 750 (stating "lilt is far more desirable to
allow state courts to apply and develop their own law" regarding plaintiffs' "more novel"
claims).
' See id. at 748 (noting that potential for high individual damages, punitive damages,
and recovery of attorney's fees make individual suits feasible).
' See id. at 747-48 n.25 (C[A]consortium of well-financed plaintiffs' lawyers... [could]
develop the expertise and specialized knowledge sufficient to beat the tobacco companies at
their own game.").
"
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well.37 Fourth, according to the court, bifurcating the non-common
issues, and having them decided by juries other than the one that
would decide the common issues, would violate the Seventh
Amendment.38 The court believed that severing the issues relating
to the conduct of the defendants from the comparative negligence
issue would necessitate reexamination of the verdict regarding the
defendants' conduct, and that the risk that the second jury would
reevaluate the parties' relative fault would be so great that a class
39
action would not be a superior way to adjudicate the controversy.

37
See id. (stating that some of defendants alleged advantages could be overcome
through "coordination or consolidation of cases for discovery and other pretrial matters").
3s See id. at 750 (" The right to a jury trial is a right to have jurable issues determined

by the first jury impaneled to hear them ... and not reexamined by another finder of fact.'"
(quoting In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995))). But see Patrick
Wooley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 IOWA
L. REV. 499 (1998) (taking contrary position).
3
Castano, 84 F.3d at 750-51. The court did not consider whether somewhat more
limited issues than the entirety of defendant's fault might be severable. In some mass tort
cases, the trial courts have severed issues such as general causation. See In re Bendectin
Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming jury finding of no causation in limitedissues trial of 1,180 claims regarding drug said to cause birth defects); see alsoIn re Beverly
Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 210 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that trial judge had bifurcated trial
such that jury would first decide whether allegedly defective wiring had caused restaurant
fire, and if so, would then decide issues of liability and damages). Reexamination would not
appear to be a risk in such a situation because the jury in the later proceeding would simply
be instructed that the product has been found to be a possible causal agent for the relevant
range of injuries.
The Castano court, however, rejected the further argument that despite any
disadvantages, class proceedings remain the superior vehicle for the case because individual
proceedings would simply take too long. Castano, 84 F.3d at 751. The court stated that
delays so far have not been great, that survivorship claims are available, and that a class
action may not be quicker than individual proceedings. Id. at 751 & n.32.
Regarding the Seventh Amendment, a recent asbestos decision sets up yet another barrier
to one method of dispcsing of large numbers of tobacco cases in a single class action
proceeding. In Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998), the court held
that use of extrapolation from representative trials to determine thousands of untried cases
(and hundreds of cases not tried as to product exposure) violated the defendants' Seventh
Amendment right to individual jury determinations in each case. See id. at 319-21 (finding
Seventh Amendment viclation because Texas law requires that causation"be determined as
to 'individuals, not groups' '.
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Castanois the decision of a single circuit,4" though another circuit
has recently affirmed decertification of a Federal Rule 23(b)(2) class
for medical monitoring of tobacco victims, reasoning that the
individual nature of issues pertaining to liability prevented class
treatment.4 ' Still another circuit has joined the Castano court in
rejecting class certification of a mass products liability injury on the
ground, inter alia, that the tort was immature and the idea that
cases of this type are unsuitable for consolidated treatment has
substantial support in the scholarly literature. 42 In In re RhonePoulencRorer, Inc.,43 the Seventh Circuit reversed the certification
of a class action case over injuries from tainted blood products. The
court declared that the combination of the claims would create
irresistible pressures on the defendant to settle.44 The court also
a trial applying
questioned the ability of the district court to manage
45
states.
different
of
the disparate tort standards
The specifics of the Castano holding, and the resonance of an
approach to federal class actions that challenges their appropriateness in mass products claims, particularly novel ones, combine to
place severe obstacles in the way of federal class proceedings over
tobacco exposure. In another case, the circuit responsible for

Commentary specifically on Castanoincludes: Robert T. Krebs, Note, Castano v.
American Tobacco Co.: Class Treatment of Mass Torts is Going Up in Smoke, 24 N. KY. L.
REV. 673 (1997); Recent Case, 110 HARV. L. REV. 977 (1997). A number of federal district
court decisions also reject Rule 23(b)(3) class action proceedings over tobacco exposure. E.g.,
Barreras Ruiz v. American Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194 (D.P.R. 1998) (denying certification
of plaintiff class of all smokers in Puerto Rico); Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (refusing to certify plaintiff class of Pennsylvania smokers).
"' Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., No. 97-1844, 1998 WL 783960 (3d Cir. Nov. 12,
1998). Rule 23(b)(2) allows class actions for injunctive relief when the defendant has acted
on grounds generally applicable to the class. The requirements of typicality, existence of a
common question of law or fact, and representative adequacy apply to subdivision (b)(2)
actions, but unlike in subdivision (b)(3) actions, no predominance or superiority need be
shown. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
4' In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). The most influential
source regarding the unsuitability of "immature" mass tort litigation for class action
treatment is Francis E. McGovern, Resolving MatureMass Tort Litigation,69 B.U. L. REV.
659 (1989).
43 51 F.3d 1293.
44 Id. at 1298.
41 See id. at 1300 CThe law of negligence ...
may as the plaintiffs have argued forcefully
we think not ....[b]ut nuance can be
though
nuance,
in
only
states
the
to us differ among
important....").
40
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Castano has interpreted it to mean that a class action is not
appropriate when damages claims for emotional distress from
employment discrimination are to be determined by a jury even
under a uniform federal law standard.46 This holding casts still
more doubt on the propriety of federal class proceedings in a case for
damages over tobacco exposure.4 7
B. AMCHEM

The Castano decision foreshadowed Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor,4" a Supreme Court decision that rejected the settlement of
a class action embracing individuals with injuries from exposure to
asbestos. Amchem pushes the idea of a single, federal class action
over tobacco diseases still further out of reach. The Amchem Court
affirmed the reversal of the settlement of a nationwide class action
over asbestos exposure.49 The rationale was that the class failed
Federal Rule 23.b)(3)'s requirement that common issues predominate5" as well as Rule 23(a)(4)'s requirement that the representative
adequately protect the interests of the class.5 The Court also
expressed doubt that effective notice of the class action and
settlement was possible when the class included individuals who
had not yet developed illness from asbestos exposure and those who
will accrue, but have not yet accrued, derivative claims (such as
those for consortium) or even come into a position to accrue the
claims through marriage or dependency.52 The Court stated that a
settlement-only class need not meet the same standards of trial

' See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,419 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
class action is inappropriate because claims for compensatory and punitive damages would
"focus almost entirely Dn facts and issues specific to individuals rather than the class as a
whole").
" The Allison approach appears particularly restrictive in its effects when one considers
that an employer-widE case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which was what was
before the court, had previously been considered paradigmatic for class treatment. See 7A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1776 (2d ed. 1986)
(discussing use of class actions for civil rights violations).
48 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
'9 Id. at 2252.
50 Id. at 2249-50.
51 Id. at 2250-51.
62 Id. at 2252.
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manageability as one to be litigated to judgment must meet.53 Its
holdings on representative adequacy and predominance of common
questions establish, however, that claimants in a mass tort class
action must be separated into distinct subclasses, each with its own
representatives. 54 The division should proceed along the lines of the
nature of illness or injury, certainly whether it is manifest or not,
and perhaps also according to what kind of illness and of what
severity;5 5 subclassing may also be needed based on the law that will
govern the recovery. 56 At least as far as settlement classes are
concerned, notice considerations are likely to confine
class member57
injury.
manifest
currently
who
individuals
to
ship
In Amchem, the Court also had before it an argument that the
entire case was not suitable for the federal courts because it was
filed to put into place a settlement of the claims of the class against
the defendants, and the class included individuals who had not
manifested injury.5 8 Federal courts handle only cases and controversies, not feigned disputes or moot questions. 59 The Court refused
to consider the Article III issue, stating that the resolution of the
appropriateness of the class certification was "logically antecedent"

53Id.

at 2248.

See id. at 2251 C''[Aidversity among subgroups requires that the members of each
subgroup cannot be bound to a settlement except by consents given by those who ...
represent solely the members of their respective subgroups.' " (quoting In re Joint E. & S.
Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 743 (2d Cir. 1992))).
'
See id. (noting concern over named parties representing class members with diverse
medical conditions and exposure-only class members).
'
See id. at 2250 (observing that differences in state law "compound" the factual
disparities between exposure-only and presently-injured plaintiffs).
5' See supratext accompanying note 52 (recognizing notice issues for claims that may
have not yet accrued).
58
See id. at 2244 (noting objectors' argument that proceeding is not justiciable because
it is "a nonadversarial endeavor" to impose a binding administrative compensation scheme
on individuals whose claims are not ripe).
59 See U.S. CONST., art III, § 2 CThe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases... [and]
Controversies.
...
). Many authorities have questioned the existence of Article III
jurisdiction in settlement class actions such as Amchem. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort ClassAction, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1422-33 (1995);
see also Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2244 (describing ripeness and standing objections).
54
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and ought to be reached first.6" Once the class settlement was
overturned, there was no occasion to revisit justiciability.6
Authorities disagree about whether Amchem spells the end of
mass tort class actions such as those over tobacco-related illness in
the federal courts.62 At the minimum, Amchem has made the
federal forum less attractive than the state forum for those who
wish to frame classes to include persons with disparate types and
degrees of injury from a given product.63 Moreover, the need to
create subclasses based on governing state law limits the prospects
for creating a national class in a federal case and makes a statewide
class appear to be all that even the most ambitious would-be class
representative could achieve.64 If a statewide class is all that the
courts are likely to approve, a state forum might seem all the more
attractive.

r
61

Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2244.
Since the Cour, analyzed the propriety of settlement classes under Federal Rule 23

and concluded that they did not need to meet the same trial manageability standards as cases
brought with an expectation of trial (though they had to meet higher standards of
commonality and representative adequacy), it may have implied that class actions brought
just for settlement meet constitutional approval. The Court voiced its strongest doubts over
whether exposure-only claimants without manifest injuries have claims at all, much less ones
that satisfy the juriscictional minimum for a federal court class action with diversity
jurisdiction. See id. at 2244 n.15.
Compare Eric D. Green, A Post-Georgine Note, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 873 (1997)
6"
(asserting that mass tort class actions will not be viable after Amchem) with Linda S.
Mullenix, CourtSettles Settlement Class Issue, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 11, 1997, at B12 (stating that
mass tort class actions will continue to be viable). See generallyMark C. Weber, A ConsentBased Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1182-93 (1998) (criticizing approach to class action settlement taken
byAmchem Court but noting that mass tort class actions are likely to continue to be brought).
'
This conclusion must be tempered by the likelihood that some of the considerations
that the Court identified in Rule 23's requirements might be imposed on state court class
actions as a matter of procedural due process. The Supreme Court has made clear that
procedural due process protects the monetary claims of plaintiff class members. See Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (holding that state court may exercise
jurisdiction over absent class-action plaintiff for damages claim as long as "minimal
procedural due process protection" is provided). See generallyWeber, supra note 62, at 1178
(noting impact of Shutts on class action law).
" State courts may entertain nationwide classes but must meet due process standards
in so doing. See, e.g., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799 (upholding jurisdiction over plaintiff class
although class members were from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and several foreign
countries). Nevertheless, before Amchem, those bringing the cases may well have believed
that federal courts would be more likely to approve a class of that breadth. See Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979) (approving national class in federal court action
concerning government benefits).
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II. THE AVAILABILITY OF STATE CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE
The obstacles to the use of federal class action procedure do not
stand in the way of state class action cases, at least if the classes are
carefully framed. State procedure avoids the problems raised by
Castano and Amchem. State procedural rules themselves appear
mostly to permit class actions in mass tort cases. Moreover,
objections to state court class actions based on subject matter

jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and choice of law can be met
fairly easily.
A. CASTANO ISSUES

If the state court restricts the tobacco injury class to those
persons whose claims are governed by the law of the state, it will,
with a stroke, eliminate most of the concerns raised by the Castano
court about federal nationwide class action litigation over tobacco
injuries. The need for "Esperanto instructions"65 will not be present.
If the case is restricted to state residents, some of whose claims
might require application of different law, the case will be far more
manageable as to choice of law than a national class would be.
Mechanisms exist for trying cases when more than one law applies
to different groups of litigants.6" The trial becomes unmanageable
when the number of groups proliferates out of control, as it would
with a national class whose claims would be governed by the laws
of fifty states.6"

'
See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating
preference for state courts to develop own state law rather than federal courts applying" 'a
kind of Esperanto [jury] instruction"') (quoting In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,
1300 (7th Cir. 1995), where court reversed certification of nationwide class because trial
would require jury instruction that "merg[ed] the negligence standards of the 50 states and
the District of Columbia").
'
One such procedure entails empaneling several juries, each of which hears all
common evidence, but leaves the room when evidence irrelevant to its determination comes
in, and listens only to instructions based on the law that applies to it. See Mark C. Weber,
Mass Jury Trials in Mass Tort Cases: Some PreliminaryIssues, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 473
(1999) (describing procedure).
'7
Of course, particularly in the larger states, there may be one or more persons whose
claims might be governed by the law of each of the 50 states. In those circumstances, the case
might be split into more manageable groupings. The same would be true for those whose
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Although a federal class could be fashioned with the same
restrictions suggested here for state class cases, the state class has
the added advantage of avoiding Castano'scomplaint over federal
guesses about the content of state law, as would be required in a
federal case by the Erie doctrine.6" The state courts would be able
to develop their own law themselves and apply it immediately in a
concrete setting. 9
The Castano court also believed that common issues did not
predominate over the individual issue of reliance with regard to
claims sounding in fraud and misrepresentation."0 The court
believed that individual trials would need to take place on whether
the particular plaintiff class member relied on the tobacco companies' misrepresentations. 1 State courts may not see matters quite
the same way, however. Many states have permitted class actions
in consumer fraud cases, accepting conclusive or rebuttable
presumptions that consumers were misled by the defendants'
falsehoods.7 ' The analogy from consumer fraud to the tobacco
consumers' fraud and misrepresentation claims is close. Even
federal courts have allowed securities fraud cases to proceed as class
actions in spite of the supposed need to show each investor's
reliance. In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court accepted
the idea that a misrepresentation affects an entire market by
temporarily and artificially raising stock prices, ultimately causing
economic loss even to investors who do not themselves rely on the

claims are covered in part by different laws.
r See supratext accompanying notes 27-28 (discussing Castano court's concerns over
state law variations because of Erie).
6". The concreteness of a particular case makes development of the law there superior
to its development in a question certified from the federal to the state court. Mark C. Weber,
Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutionaland PracticalAdvantages of the
State Forum over the FederalForum in Mass Tort Cases, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215, 235
(1994).

7" See supra text accompanying note 29 (discussing reliance issues in Castano).
71

id.

See, e.g., Cope v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 696 N.E.2d 1001, 1008 (Ohio 1998)
(allowing inference of reliance by entire class if plaintiffs prove defendant failed to give
mandatory disclosure warnings regarding insurance policies); Stellema v. Vantage Press,
Inc., 492 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (noting that reliance could be presumed in
class action regarding publication contracts once representations are shown to be material
and false).
7' 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
71
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false information."4 Given that most smokers start before they are
sixteen years old,75 state courts might well accept the idea that
these teens rely on general impressions that the dangers of smoking
have not been proven, and suffer the same harm that would have
occurred had they heard the tobacco companies actually making the
statements and relied on the statements. Class action proceedings
might be particularly important in developing that theory. As
Professor Hal Scott has chronicled, developments in class action
cases led to the construction of the fraud-on-the-securities-market
theory.76
Another analogous situation in which state courts have dispensed
with making individual determinations about plaintiff conduct is
the use of "heeding presumptions" in products liability failure-towarn cases." The "heeding presumption" lightens the plaintiffs
burden in proving causation by presuming that the plaintiffs in fact
read the product use warnings that they are attacking as inadequate.7" Not only would these presumptions be directly applicable
to warning-related claims over tobacco, 9 but their use might lead
the same courts to apply a heeding presumption to fraud claims
based on misinformation about the safety of smoking disseminated
7" See id. at 247 (accepting "fraud-on-the-market theory" that presumes investor's
reliance on publicly available misrepresentations since market price is based on those
misrepresentations).
7 See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play'sThird Act: RevisitingAddiction, Fraud
and Consumer Choice in 'Third Wave"Tobacco Litigation,46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465,485 (1998)
(noting that one study found 14 to be the average starting age of smokers).
"' See Hal S. Scott, Comment, The Impact of ClassActions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 337, 348-71 (1971) (discussing 1969 case where court found reliance by class members
based on fact that defendant's fraud influenced market prices). Hal Scott is currently a
professor at Harvard University Law School.
17
See Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 719-20 (1993) (collecting cases where
courts adopted "heeding presumption").
7R See id. at 720-21 (explaining presumption adopted by court).
7 Federal law preempts only claims based on the inadequacy of warnings on the
cigarette packages, not claims based on the inadequacy of warnings in other materials. See
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992) (holding that state law claims for
failure to warn and failure to include additional or clearer warnings on cigarette packages are
preempted by federal law); see also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., ProductLiability-Cigarettesand
Cipollone: What's Left? What's Gone?, 53 LA. L. REV. 713, 729 (1993) (noting that state law
claims regarding inadequate warnings on cigarette packages would be preempted); Michael
D. Green, Cipollone Revisited: A Not So Little SecretAbout the Scope of CigarettePreemption,
82 IOWA L. REV. 1257 (1997) (arguing Cipollone requires preemption only of state law failureto-warn claims concerning warnings on cigarette packages).
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by the tobacco companies. The court might presume that smokers
learned of the inaccurate health claims the companies made and
continued smoking based on the statements unless the defendant
provides proof that a given class member did not do so.
State proceedings are also different from a federal proceeding
with a national class with regard to the superiority of the class
action. As for the first superiority concern listed in Castano, that
the combination of claims creates irresistible pressure to settle,"0
each of fifty or fewer combinations will be much smaller than
Castano'sone gargantuan class. If the fate of the industry is really
at stake, it will be in the hands of juries in each of the states, not a
single body of six or twelve individuals out of the whole of the
country. Needless to say, state courts may alsohave different views
from that of the Castanocourt about the irresistibility of settlement,
and the fairness of placing the pressure of combined proceedings on
the defendants.8
The second and third complaints that the Castano court lodged
against the federal class proceeding's superiority sounded in the
economics of class actions. The court determined that there was no
caseload crisis for the class action to solve, that benefits of the class
action in terms of judicial economy were dubious in light of the
probable need for individual proceedings, and that the individual
cases would generate enough probable recovery to support individual actions.8" These considerations may be no different in federal
court than they are in state court, but the state courts may view
them in a different light. Even if the number of tobacco cases has
not risen out of control, the state courts may find the comparison to
the early years of the asbestos crisis to be alarming. The pattern
begins with a few cases, most with defense verdicts, followed by
persuasive evidence of corporate cover-ups about safety information,
followed by failed attempts at legislative resolution, followed by an

8

See supra text accompanying note 31 (discussing court's concern over pressure to
settle due to massing of claims).
" See infra Section IH.C. (discussing arguments concerning fairness to defendants of
class proceedings).
82 See supra text accompanying notes 32-37 (discussing Castano coures concerns over
economic considerations for judicial system and plaintiffs).
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aggressive plaintiffs' bar obtaining enough money from some cases"3
to finance others: It all adds up to a crisis about to happen. The
state courts may see the filing of a class action as their chance to
prevent a repeat of the dislocations caused by the asbestos litigation. Asbestos, of course, injured far fewer individuals than tobacco
has injured and continues to harm.84
Individual follow-up proceedings to the class action, if they are
needed, would certainly detract from the efficiency advantage of a
class proceeding. But their necessity depends heavily on determinations of state law that the state courts have some control over.
For example, if the court determines that under its version of
common law fraud or misrepresentation torts that no showing of
individual reliance is necessary, a large-scale trial may be held on
the entirety of that claim.
Finally, the state courts might find the cost savings of a class
action significant enough to justify class certification, even if
individual cases could finance themselves. The savings of combined
pretrial and trial activities are equally real even when the value of
each case might generate enough revenue to support individual
litigation. Moreover, as explained more fully below, whether any
individual tobacco case will or will not pay for itself is chancy. Many
claimants will find their damages reduced drastically by comparative negligence and many will fail in other respects.8 5 Figuring out
which cases are strong enough to justify the considerable investment necessary to prevail against astoundingly well-funded defense
lawyers will perplex even the most skillful advocates. In the
absence of class proceedings, many potential plaintiffs are likely to
be unable to find attorneys who will invest enough of their money
and time in the cases to make them worthwhile. There may still be

" In the tobacco cases, the money will come from the state Medicaid class settlement.
See supranotes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing settlement between tobacco companies
and states).
' Compare Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2237 (1997) (citing
prediction of 265,000 total deaths from asbestos before year 2015) (quoting from REPORT OF
THEJUDICIALCONFERENCEAD HOc COMM. ONASBESTOSLITIG. 2-3 (Mar. 1991)), with GLANTZ,

supra note 6, at 436 (citing estimate of 420,000 smoking deaths each year).
' See Cupp, supra note 75, at 499-506 (discussing issues of comparative negligence,
assumption of risk, and nicotine addiction regarding smokers' likelihood of recovery).
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enough cases to swamp various jurisdictions, but recovery will not

be available to some who would deserve it.
The fourth superiority objection, that the trial of the class action
necessarily entails trial bifurcation in violation of the Seventh
Amendment," is inapplicable to state class action proceedings for
the simple reason that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to
the states. States may, of course, confront similar issues with
analogous state constitutional provisions or statutes. Under
existing state law, the permissibility of bifurcation and the use of
separate juries varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 8 Some forms
of bifurcation necessarily occur in all jurisdictions, state or federal:
When a jury finds for the defendant and the decision is reversed on
appeal under the clear-error standard or its state law analogue, the
court on remand empanels a second jury, which determines the
damages.89 Whether this situation is sufficiently analogous to the
splitting of the decision that occurs when general causation or other
issues are given to one jury and individual questions of exposure or
comparative fault are given to another, is a matter for each state to
decide. If the state does not permit this form of bifurcation, a class
trial may indeed be unmanageable, though perhaps the action might
proceed as a class during pretrial proceedings.9"

w See supratext accompanying notes 38-39 (discussing Seventh Amendment argument
in Castano).
" See, e.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916)
(noting Seventh Amendment does not regulate state courts).
" See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE 3295(d) (West 1997) (conferring choice as to bifurcation on
trial defendant); Mason v. Dunn, 285 N.E.2d 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (holding that court lacks
authority, in absence of statute or state supreme court rule, to bifurcate trial over objection
of one of the parties).
' Beyond this fairly obvious point is the reality that Castano departs from much
existing federal precedent on bifurcation of trial in complex cases. See, e.g., In re Bendectin
Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 308 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that Federal Rule 42(b) gives trial judge
discretion regarding trying issues separately); In re Paris Air Crash, 69 F.R.D. 310, 318-19
(C.D. Cal. 1975) (stating Federal Rule 42(b) allows bifurcation for convenience, avoidance of
prejudice or when "conducive to expedition and economy").
' If bifurcation is permissible, it may still be inadvisable, for conventional wisdom and
some empirical studies suggest that defense verdicts are more likely when abstract issues
such as general causation are separated from issues that present information about human
suffering, such as individual causation and damages. See Mark C. Weber, Managing Complex
Litigation in the Illinois Courts, 27 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 959, 978 nn.127-30 (1996) (citing
collections of studies). A recent work of interest on this topic is Stephan Landsman et al., Be
Careful What You Wish for: The ParadoxicalEffects of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive
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B. AMCHEMISSUES

As for the concerns that motivated the Amchem Court, there is
no telling whether state courts will find them applicable at all.
Amchem relied entirely on the federal class action rule. 9 State
courts might interpret their rules differently. Nevertheless, many
state class action rules are similar to Federal Rule 23,92 and the
Supreme Court has established that some class action procedures
are constitutionally required under the obligation to afford litigants
procedural due process. 9 3 State courts thus might apply some or all

of Amchem to the tobacco class actions before them.
If they do apply Amchem, however, they still should be able to
entertain the class actions. At the minimum, they will need to place
those persons who have current manifestations of injury into a
subclass different from that of persons who do not yet have
injuries. 94 The logistics of making that separation would not be
difficult, nor would they become impossible even if Amchem were
interpreted to require still further subclassing based on the severity
of manifest illnesses. If all persons in the class are to have their

Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 297 (reporting complex effects from separation of compensatory
claims from punitive claims in empirical study). Some may applaud this result, contending
that decisions for plaintiffs in cases that are not bifurcated may be motivated by sympathy
for the plaintiff when the evidence on causation or other aspects of liability in fact exonerate

the defendant. Others would argue that the sterile atmosphere presented when technical
issues such as general causation are considered alone causes juries to fail to take seriously
their responsibility to consider all aspects of the evidence. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr.
et al., OptimalIssue Separationin Modern ProductsLiability Litigation,73 TEx. L. REv. 1653
(1995) (proposing bifurcation of general causation only in limited classes of cases); see also
McGovern, supra note 42, at 691-92 (discussing issue separation). One compromise is to
combine a limited trial on common issues such as general causation for the class with a
plenary trial on all the issues for selected individual plaintiffs. This technique avoids creating
the atmosphere of a graduate seminar on epidemiology but can still expedite decision on

important controversies common to all class members. See Weber, supranote 66 (discussing
procedure).
9' See supra Section I.B. (discussing Coures rationale).
92 See, e.g., CONN. SUPER. CT. R. 9-7 (providing state rule for class actions, which mirrors
Federal Rule 23(a)); N.J. CT. C.P.R. 4:32-1 (setting forth state class action rule, which is
almost identical to Federal Rule 23).
' See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (noting that due
process requires that plaintiffclass members "receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard
and participate in the litigation").
' See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing necessity of plaintiff
subclasses based on manifestation of injury).
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claims governed by the law of the same state, the rest of Amchem's
concerns about commonality will disappear.95
The problem of notice96 is more difficult, though Amchem did not
have a square holding on the subject, even one based on the federal
rule. If the Court meant to say--or if the state court thinks it meant
to say-that no person not currently injured is likely to appreciate
the significance of class action notice in a matter as important as a
toxic tort case, then all those individuals will have to be excluded
from the class. Perhaps some kind of affirmative opt-in mechanism
could be used to resolve their claims through a class proceeding, but
ordinary class procedure will not work. The Court seemed fairly
adamant that derivative claims, especially of persons who are
impossible to notify, such as future spouses or dependents, cannot
be precluded because of the lack of notice. 7 The state courts should,
and probably will, exclude those persons from the class if the
persons cannot be given notice and the right to opt out.
The Amchem Court never reached the issue of whether a class
action brought with settlement in mind satisfies the adverseness
requirements of Article III jurisdiction. 9 I have argued elsewhere
that the proceeding meets the standards99 but the issue is irrelevant
to state courts, which are not bound by Article III.1"' Even under
the federal justiciability standards, whether persons whose injuries
have not manifested themselves have a case is actually a question
of underlying state law, i.e., whether the state considers exposure
to a toxic substance without pathology the accrual of a cause of
6
See supranote 56 and accompanying text (noting possible need to subdivide plaintiff
classes based on governing state law).
9 See supratext accompanying note 52 (discussing Court's concern regarding notice to
potential class members whose claims have not yet accrued).
9

Id.

See supra text accompanying note 60 (noting Court's refusal to decide Article III
issue).
Weber, supra note 62, at 1180-81.
o States vary on what degree of adversariness they require court proceedings to
maintain. Some courts offer advisory opinions, while others have approaches to mootness and
other justiciability issues that are far more relaxed than Article In standards. See, e.g.,
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-11, at 82 n.1 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing problem of Supreme Court review of state court decisions in cases that do not
meet federal court justiciability requirements); see also Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S.
100, 102 (1982) (noting that standing in state court does not preclude Supreme Court from
independent determination of standing to raise constitutional issue).
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action.' States will need to develop their own law with regard to
tobacco exposure, but any smoker's claim would be fully ripe in any
state that has a cause of action for fear of disease, medical monitoring, or the probability of future harm." 2 Courts in states without
these claims will need to determine whether their law permits
claims for addiction without further pathology and if the answer is
no, they will need to limit the class of tobacco litigants to those with
manifest injury. As indicated above, considerations of notice might
induce them to do so in any instance.
C. ISSUES OF STATE PROCEDURE

Many states have class action statutes or rules similar to Federal
Rule 23.103 These states may or may not be persuaded by the
interpretations of the federal rule in Castano and the other federal
cases that tobacco injuries are not suited for class treatment. Even
if otherwise inclined to follow Castano, however, they might
conclude that a class action restricted to the persons with claims
governed by the forum state's law or residents of the state with
claims governed by its law, is sufficiently distinct from the federal
class in Castano as to be permitted." 4 In any event, some of the
country's largest states, such as California ' and Illinois,' have
class action provisions different from Federal Rule 23. Though the
reach of state class action law remains uncertain both in replica and
non-replica states,' 7 the trend is towards permitting at least some

'0' Weber, supra note 62, at 1181.
102

Id.

103

See sources cited supra note 92.

104 Lower federal courts in a similar position have not been so persuaded. See supranote

40 (citing federal district court cases that denied class certification in tobacco cases).
105 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973) ("[W]hen the question is one of a common
or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit
of all.").
' See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-801 to -806 (West 1992) (allowing class actions when (1)
joinder is impracticable due to numerosity; (2) common questions of fact or law predominate;
(3) representatives fairly and adequately protect class interests; and (4) class action is
appropriate method for fair and efficient adjudication).
107 Replica states are those whose class action statutes are identical or
nearly identical
to Federal Rule 23.
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product liability and other actions analogous to tobacco cases to go
forward as class actions. Moreover, some state courts have
approved class action litigation over tobacco exposure under their
particular class action provisions, though not all who have been
asked have done so.' 08
Some cases in which state courts have permitted class actions
concern defective products and claims based on product liability,
fraud, or related theories. Despite potential issues of individual
reliance, individual damages, and individual comparative or
contributory negligence, courts permitted the actions to proceed.
The products involved in the cases have included cars with malfunctioning engines,"' hardwood siding said to be defective and falsely
advertised,"' furnaces that leaked carbon monoxide and that were
said to have been fraudulently marketed,' lead paint that was said
to have poisoned children, 1 32 and silicone breast implants said to
11
cause numerous ailments.
Other analogous cases in which class actions have been allowed
have involved single-incident disasters or similar occurrences.
Though the comparison to tobacco products might be somewhat
weaker than with the other cases, these cases also show that state
courts are willing to use class action procedure to obtain the benefits
of judicial economy despite the certain need for individual determinations of damages and the prospect of individual determinations
with regard to defenses. These cases involve occurrences such as

' " See infra notes 117-122 and accompanying text (citing state class action suits over
tobacco exposure).
"'
In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 461 A.2d 736 (N.J. 1983).
110 ExparteMasonite Corp., 681 So. 2d 1068 (Ala. 1996).
"z
Delgozzo v. Kenny, 628 A.2d 1080 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
11, Jackson v. Glidden Co., 647 N.E.2d 879 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). Theories of recovery
included absolute product liability, negligence per se, breach of implied warranties, fraud by
misrepresentation, nuisance, enterprise liability, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
alternative liability, and market share liability. Id. at 881.
"' Spitzfaden v. Dow Corning Corp., 619 So. 2d 795 (La. Ct. App. 1993). Theories
included products liability, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, a state-law merchantability theory, breach of implied and express warranty, and intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 797.
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salmonella poisoning,114 a chemical spill,'1 5 and a building with a
16
contaminated ventilation system.
A few state courts have already approved class action tobacco
litigation, though they have generally restricted the classes to
persons with close ties to the forum state. For example, the Florida
Appellate Court modified what had been a nationwide class of
persons who had suffered or died from diseases and medical
conditions caused by their addiction to cigarettes to make the class
117
one of Florida citizens and residents that met the same criteria.
So modified, the class satisfied the conditions of the Florida class
action law and placed the state judiciary in a situation to manage
the litigation efficiently." 8 In another case, the Florida Appellate
Court has allowed the plaintiffs to go forward with a nationwide
class action of non-smoking flight attendants exposed to secondhand
smoke." 9 A statewide class action of smokers is also proceeding in
the Louisiana state courts, having survived an attempt to remove
the case to federal court. 2 ' A New York court, however, found that
tobacco-exposure classes did not meet the state's standards for class
litigation.' 2 ' New York's Appellate Division overturned certification
of classes including all nicotine-dependent smokers who purchased

114 Cornerwood Healthcare, Inc. v. Estate of Herron, 683 N.E.2d 1322 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997); see also In re Salmonella Litig., 618 N.E.2d 473 (11. App. Ct. 1993) (requiring addition
of individuals to class).
"' Adams v. CSX R.R., 615 So. 2d 476 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
...Klocke v. A & D Ltd., 629 N.E.2d 49 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
17 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.-v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).

118 See id. at 42 (noting limitation will allow Florida judiciary to "efficiently manage the
litigation without undue burden to taxpayers"). Trial in the Engle case began on October 19,
1998. See, e.g., Landmark Sinokers'Suit Goes to Trial in Florida,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1998,
at A28; Mike Williams, Tobacco Industry on Trialin Florida,ATLANTA CoNST., Oct. 20, 1998,
at A3.
"l
Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
'2
See Scott v. American Tobacco Co., 959 F. Supp. 340, 343-44 (E.D. La. 1996) (denying
removal, noting proper joinder of nondiverse distributor to whom state-law redhibition claim
applied). But see Lyons v. American Tobacco Co., No. Civ. A. 96-0881-BH-S, 1997 WL 809677
(S.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 1997) (granting removal in class action with nondiverse class
representative on ground of misjoinder); Masepohl v. American Tobacco Co., 974 F. Supp.
1245 (D. Minn. 1997) (granting removal of Minnesota-resident class action after finding no
viable state law claims against nondiverse defendants). Regarding removal, see infraSection
II.D.1.
12 Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 679 N.Y.S.2d 593 (N.Y. App. Div.), appealgranted,681
N.Y.S.2d 748 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
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the defendants' cigarettes in the state, holding that the classes did
not meet the state law's requirements of predominance122of common
issues and typicality, and adequacy of representation.
D. OTHER OBSTACLES

Other obstacles to the use of state court class actions over tobacco
injuries include the prospect of removal to federal court on grounds
of federal subject matter jurisdiction; limits to state court personal
jurisdiction; potential difficulties with choice of law; and class
definition problems.
1. Removal. A defendant seeking to avoid a state-court class
action suit over tobacco injuries might try to remove the action to
federal court under the theory that the case could originally have
been filed there under diversity jurisdiction 121 or federal question
jurisdiction. 124 For the latter jurisdictional basis, the most likely
federal claim to be identified would be that of the RacketeerInfluenced Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)125 in cases asserting
state law claims of fraud or misrepresentation. The plaintiffs
should be able to avoid removal on either ground but they may pay
a price in potential relief by doing so.
Removal on the basis of diversity is doomed to failure in all cases
in which the plaintiffs have the foresight to sue a co-citizen, such as
a tobacco distributor or marketer whose place of incorporation or
principal place of business is the same as that of one of the plaintiffs. 2 ' Although federal class actions brought under diversity
'2 Id. at 600-01. The action was not a products liability class action but a consumer
fraud case to recover money spent on cigarettes and obtain injunctive relief. Id. at 597.
l2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (providing for federal court jurisdiction
when amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and action is between parties with diverse
citizenship).
- See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (providing for federal court jurisdiction when claim is
based on federal Constitution, laws, or treaties).
"z See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (providing federal civil remedy for
injuries to business or property caused by racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt).
r"GSee Scott v. American Tobacco Co., No. Civ. A. 97-1178, 1997 WL 749415 (E.D. La.
Dec. 2, 1997) (remanding removed case to state court when plaintiffcitizens of Louisiana sued
in-state tobacco distributors under state-law redhibition cause of action). But see Masepohl
v. American Tobacco Co., 974 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Minn. 1997) (granting removal of Minnesotaresident class action after finding no viable state law claims against nondiverse defendants).
The issue, though it may appear to be one of federal removal practice, is in fact one of state
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jurisdiction are an exception to the complete diversity rule,'2 7 the
underlying purpose of removal in a state tobacco class action would
be to defeat class action treatment of the claim when it gets to
federal court. Thus, under the defendants' own analysis, the action
being removed may or may not be a class action for state law
purposes but is most emphatically not a class action under the
Federal Rules. Accordingly, there is no basis to invoke the class
action exception to the complete diversity rule. If the defendant
succeeds in having the court apply the class-action exception to the
complete diversity rule, it could only be on the grounds that federal
class action is appropriate under Federal Rule 23, and so the case
ought to proceed as a class in federal court, contrary to the dictates
of Castano. Of course, a federal court outside the Fifth Circuit could
reject Castano, predicting that its circuit would not follow the
precedent, but the combination of Castano and Amchem make it
unlikely that a federal court will consider tobacco cases proper for
class action treatment.
Another removal-protection tactic that might be successful would
be to name one citizen of the same citizenship as the corporate
defendants to be one of the named plaintiffs in the state class action,
effectively destroying complete diversity among named parties. If
the nondiverse representative is named in good faith, diversity
would be destroyed. 128 This maneuver would not work, however, if
law. The content of the state's consumer fraud or product liability law determines whether
nondiverse defendants such as distributors are proper defendants. See Scott, 1997 WL
749415, at *1.
"z See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) ('[l]f
one member of a class is of diverse
citizenship from the class's opponent, and no nondiverse members are named parties, the suit
may be brought in federal court even though all other members of the class are citizens of the
same State as the defendant ....
);see also Andrew P. Campbell, Class Actions: A Primer,
20 Am.J. TRIAL ADvoc. 305, 320 (1996-97) ("Filing a nationwide class increases the chances
of having the case removed and sent to a federal multi-district litigation panel ....").
Generally, complete diversity requires that no member of one side to a lawsuit be a citizen
of the same state as any member of the opposing side. See 13B WRIGHT ETAL., supranote 47,
§ 3605 (discussing requirement of complete diversity that arose from Strawbridge v. Curtiss,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806)).
"2See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 481 F. Supp. 71, 74 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) C'T]he good faith naming of a [class] representative that defeats federal jurisdiction
has long been allowed."); 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 47, § 3606 (discussing which parties
are considered in determining diversity). But see Lyons v. American Tobacco Co., No. Civ. A.
96-0881-BH-S, 1997 WL 809677, at *4-6 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 1997) (granting removal in class
action with nondiverse class representative on ground of misjoinder). The Lyons case found
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the state court were to choose to restrict the class definition to
citizens of the forum state under its discretion to shape the contours
of the class.
The possibility of removal based on a federal claim would still
remain open even if diversity removal were foreclosed. The most
plausible claim on which to remove would be RICO.'29 The standard
for federal claim removal recognizes that the plaintiff is the "master
of the claim" and that if the plaintiff chooses to rely only on state
law, the case should stay in state court.'
Only if "a federal
question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded
complaint," should the case be removed.' 3 '
Defendants would have a difficult time arguing that a wellpleaded complaint in a tobacco class action would have to include a
federal RICO claim, however. Courts have denied removal requests
despite arguments that a properly pleaded complaint would include
a RICO claim when the state law claims asserted were those of
fraudulent conveyance, piercing the corporate veil, and improper
corporate payments,132 as well as when the claim was common law
fraud predicated on conduct that would constitute criminal acts
sufficient to support a RICO claim.'33 The common law fraud and

the North Carolina class representative's presence to be so artificial as to constitute
misjoinder. Id. at *4. The standard rule, however, is that any person who has a claim arising
out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences may be
joined if jurisdiction is proper. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (setting forth requirements for
permissive joinder). The standards for joinder of plaintiffs are extremely elastic. SeeMosley
v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussing joinder under Rule 20).
And while the federal jurisdictional code prohibits improper or collusive joinder of parties to
confer jurisdiction on the court, it says nothing about joining parties to defeat federal
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994) (withdrawing federal jurisdiction when based on
improper or collusive joinder); see also CHARLESALANWRIGHT, LAWOF FEDERAL COURTS § 31
(5th ed. 1994) (discussing devices to create or defeat diversity).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. 1998). The RICO statute provides a cause of action
for treble damages and attorneys' fees to plaintiffs injured by those who engage in various
illegal activities, including forms of fraud. Id. There is concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction for civil actions brought under the statute. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 467
(1990).
'

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

I'

Id.

See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1986) (denying removal).
See Browning Avenue Realty Corp. v. Rubin, No. 92 Civ. 4260 (CSH), 1993 WL 60517
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1993) (denying removal).
'

',
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the tort claims involved in a tobacco action would be no more subject
to removal than those claims.
The question, then, is whether plaintiffs in a state court class
action should forego the RICO claim in order to stay in state court
and take advantage of class action procedure. The enhanced relief
available in a RICO action is a powerful incentive to bring such an
action in any case.13 4 Obviously, plaintiffs benefit from increased
recovery reflected in the final judgment; even if the case is not
litigated to judgment, the amount of the potential recovery will
influence the amount of any settlement. Decreased exposure for the
defendant will depress the settlement expectations of the plaintiffs.
In some states, the solution is obvious: invoke state RICO
statutes that embody the same terms of liability and provide for the
same relief.13 5 Where this option is unavailable, it may be possible
to mount follow-up individual or group actions in federal court,
asserting that the claim was for practical purposes unavailable in
the state court action. The Restatement of Judgments recognizes a
jurisdictional competency standard under which a state judgment
does not bar a later-filed federal claim over which the state court
lacks jurisdiction.3 6 Nevertheless, reliance on that rule is risky in
the tobacco-RICO situation. 3 7 Concurrent jurisdiction exists for
federal civil RICO claims, 38 so the state court entertaining the
plaintiffs' suit could have adjudicated the claim. Moreover, it is
hard to imagine anything in state law that would prevent the

'34 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994) (providing for recovery of treble damages and litigation
costs, including attorneys' fees, in RICO claims).
135 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314.04 (West Supp. 1998) (providing civil
remedies for state RICO violations); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-05 (1997) (same).
'3

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFJUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1982) (stating that claim is not

barred when plaintiff was unable to raise it in earlier suit due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction). There may be some erosion of this rule, however, as evident in Matsushita
ElectricIndustrialCo. v. Epstein,516 U.S. 367 (1996), in which the Supreme Court held that
a settlement in a state court class action can release an exclusive federal claim, even though
judgment may not be entered on such a claim in state court. Matsushita"continued a trend
of having state law dictate federal preclusion doctrine." Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman,
Matsushita and Beyond. The Role of State Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive
FederalClaims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 225 n.38.
" See Kahan & Silberman, supranote 136, at 236-37 (discussing state-court class action
settlement of exclusive federal claims).
" See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 467 (1990) (holding that civil RICO statute
confers concurrent state and federal jurisdiction rather than exclusive federal jurisdiction).
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plaintiffs from asserting the claim in a class action. The plaintiffs
in the follow-up federal case would need to convince the court that
under the preclusion law governing the state court, the practical
barrier to presentation of the claim-the fact that the action would
have been removed and the class decertified-would be sufficient to
keep it from being barred. In other words, the federal court would
need to rule that the state's law of preclusion would not bar a claim
within the court's jurisdiction but practically unavailable in a state
class action. That ruling seems improbable.
Thus, forbearance of the RICO claim may carry a price in
foregone relief. In states where no statute provides relief comparable to RICO and in which the possibility of filing a subsequent action
asserting the RICO claim is foreclosed, the representative parties
will have a difficult decision whether the availability of the class
proceeding justifies the lessening of the potential recovery. Of
course, if the defendant prefers the state forum, the RICO claim
may be asserted in the state action. But given the tobacco companies' well-justified fear of class action liability, it is unlikely they
would pass up the temptation to remove to a forum inhospitable to
class proceedings in tobacco cases.
2. Limits on State Court Personal Jurisdiction. Under a
minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction and a due process
test for choice of law, the range of persons and entities that may be
subject to a state's law is greater than that subject to the state's
jurisdiction.'3 9 Thus, even if the state class action is defined in
terms of those persons whose claims would be governed by the law
of the state, the court must ask if it has personal jurisdiction over
those persons whose claims are subject to the state law but who are
themselves out of state.
The Supreme Court, however, has established that the minimum
contacts test does not apply to members of a plaintiff class action.
In PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutts, 40 the Court reasoned that class
members do not bear the burdens or risks of full litigants and that
in a class action for damages over failure to pay mineral rights

" See, eg., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) (commenting on inaptness of
choice of law tests to determine personal jurisdiction).
'40 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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royalties, out-of-state class members' due process interests were
satisfied if they received notice, the right to opt out, and adequate
representation.14 The significance of the individual's interests at
stake in the proceeding is one factor in determining what protections procedural due process requires;4 4 hence, some additional
procedural safeguards might be required in class actions with
higher damages. Nevertheless, in determining what due process
demands in cases where there is no territorial issue, courts have
required nothing more than appropriate notice and adequate review
43
of proposed settlements.
Personal jurisdiction is unlikely to be a problem with respect to
the defendants, for all the major tobacco companies have extensive
sales and marketing operations in all fifty states. The situation is
unlike Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,44 in which the
manufacturer merely placed the item in the stream of commerce far
outside the jurisdiction, and the item found its way into the state by
the action of various intermediaries without any marketing efforts
by the manufacturer.' 4 5
14' Id. at 809-12. Miner v. Gillette Co., 428 N.E.2d 478 (Ill. 1981), anticipated
this
development by approving a national class in an action to recover damages for failure of a
company to honor a coupon-discount offer it had made. The view that minimum contacts are
unnecessary has its critics. See Allen R. Kamp, The MultistateConsumer ClassAction: Local
Solutions, National Problems, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 271 (1984-85) (concluding that minimum
contacts should be required for state court jurisdiction over out-of-state plaintiff class
members). Professor Monaghan has criticized an approach to Shutts that ignores minimum
contacts and emphasizes opt-out, without also emphasizing adequate representation. Henry
Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class
Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1166-75 (1998).
142 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
'
See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252 (1997) (discussing
notice). Shutts may be viewed as merging territorial and other procedural due process
considerations, looking at the significance of the stake of the individual, the adequacy of
existing safeguards, and the benefits from more process, all general considerations of
procedural due process, in resolving an issue about the federal due process limits pertaining
to territorial jurisdiction. Mark C. Weber, Purposeful Availment, 39 S.C. L. REV. 815, 864
(1988).
14 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
'" See id. at 112 (plurality opinion) (describing significance of chain of events outside of
defendant's direct control); see also Weber, supra note 143, at 839 (analyzing Asahfs
reasoning regarding placing object in stream of commerce). The situation is also unlike that
of some asbestos defendants, who argued that they did nothing more than mine raw materials
that wound up being used by others in their products. See Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond
Consolidation: PostaggregativeProcedurein Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 475, 515-17 (1991) (describing mostly unsuccessful efforts of asbestos defendants to
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3. Choice of Law. State courts will maximize the use of their
own expertise and will advance important federalism ends146 only if
they can apply forum law to the tobacco class actions before them.
For these reasons, a class definition that embraces those persons
whose claims are governed by the forum state's law would be
optimal. Limits exist on who those persons may be. The Constitution restricts the application of forum law to issues for which the
state has "a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair,"1'47 and the restriction
applies irrespective of the individual or class action nature of the
case.14 With that qualification, however, the class could include
persons who are not currently residents of the state if they had
exposure to tobacco in the state or if the contacts with the state were
otherwise adequate to support the use of forum law with regard to
the issues of liability and damages.
4. Other Class Definition Problems. Some courts may be
uncomfortable with a class definition that is framed in terms of the
applicability of the law of the state. It may be difficult to determine
precisely who is in such a class. Without knowledge of exactly who
the class members are, the court may be unable to frame a plan for
affording notice and opt-out rights, and it may be concerned about
the uncertain scope of the preclusive effects of the final judgment.'4 9
In the situation of tobacco liability, however, general considerations of fairness and sensible judicial practice should permit class
definitions that do not identify the members specifically but that use
the reach of the state's law to determine the class's scope. The
degree of precision with which the class members are identified

escape personal jurisdiction and collecting unpublished decisions).
See infra text accompanying notes 168-170 (discussing federalism concerns).
',
"
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
l See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985) C'lMhe constitutional
limitations laid down in cases such as Allstate... must be respected even in a nationwide
class action.").
1'
See Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 1980) (rejecting class
certification under federal rule on ground that class members would be difficult to locate to
give relief); see also Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981) (rejecting certification of
class of persons denied energy assistance on ground, inter alia, that identification of class
members would be costly or impossible).

1008

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:979

should depend on the reason for identification: If the class's
interests can be protected without precise identification of class
members, the effort is not necessary.15 ° With regard to claimants'
interests in receiving notice, broad-based notice plans may be
effective in reaching all injured persons who have claims governed
by a state's law. 5 ' As for defendants' and the judicial system's
interests in preclusion, self-identification of class members by
requests for hearings on damages or acceptance of an amount of
compensation may be sufficient to determine the action's preclusive
scope. If, in a given state, the tobacco class action is brought as a
settlement class, and persons will effectively need to opt into the
class to obtain settlement relief, identification can come at that
time.'52 Individuals who do not receive notice and who do not
demand hearings or claim relief should not be considered bound by
the result of the class action.
Of course, specific state class action rules may still require
identification more precise than what is suggested here. Perhaps
those states could employ a definition that embraces persons
currently residing in the state who also had exposure to the
products and suffered damage in the state. Other persons whose
claims are governed by the law of the state and who desire relief
might intervene to join in the class, or they might file individual
actions.
23.04[l], at 104-05 (2d ed.
'50 See JAMES WM. MOORE, 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
1996) ('The membership of the class must be capable ofascertainment under some objective
standard so that the court may insure that the interests of the class are adequately
represented."(emphasis added)). If the class members' interests are fully protected without
the members being individually identified until the distribution of relief, no further
identification should be needed. See Anderson v. Coughlin, 119 F.R.D. 1, 3 (N.D.N.Y. 1988)
(not demanding precise definition of class of mentally ill prisoners under the circumstances
of case).
.. In the Amchem case, the district coures notice plan reached millions of individuals
with comprehensive and understandable information. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
158 F.R.D. 314, 320-23 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (describing plan). The Supreme Court's criticism was
not of the plan's specifics; the Court instead challenged the conceptual possibility of giving
notice to some class members, such as future spouses and children of the persons exposed to
asbestos, and the practical likelihood that persons not currently injured would fail to
appreciate the notice's significance. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252
(1997). Classes could be framed to exclude persons whose notice and opt-out rights are
impossible to protect.
152 See Weber, supra note 62, at 1210 n.279 (suggesting that identification of class
members may take place at distribution of relief).
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III. THE DESIRABILITY OF STATE CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
Even if state courts were to determine that class actions for
tobacco injuries are permissible, there remains the question
whether, as a matter of policy, these state court proceedings are
desirable. The answer must be qualified but if the proper qualifications are made, it would appear to be yes. There are serious
economic benefits to be gained from class proceedings. Concerns
should exist over whether class proceedings would afford claimants
adequate participation rights, but if adequate notice and the right
to opt out of the class are afforded, those concerns will be met. The
legitimate interests of defendants in fair treatment do not counsel
against the use of class actions. Moreover, because of federalism
reasons, state forums are the superior ones to apply and determine
the law of tobacco liability.
A. ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES OF CLASS PROCEEDINGS

Litigating tobacco cases is hideously expensive, largely because
of the tobacco defendants' scorched-earth defensive strategy. Of
course, defendants have every right to contest claims vigorously as
long as they do so within the law. A rational response for plaintiffs,
however, is to conserve resources by sharing the costs of litigation.
Class action procedure is a logical means to do so. In class action
litigation, the expenses of suit, including attorneys' fees, experts'
charges, and costs of discovery, are taken off the top of the total
recovery and thus shared among the members of a victorious class.
The Supreme Court has described the prospect of reducing and
sharing litigation costs as a significant benefit to class action
claimants.'53
Although tobacco injury cases involve damages so great that they
might be expected to cover the costs of case development and
attorneys' fees without the need to pool resources among plaintiffs,
that conclusion may be too facile. It is highly likely that plaintiffs
whose claims are successful will find their damages reduced
considerably on account of their comparative negligence in taking up
'

Deposit Guar. Natfl Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 n.9 (1980).
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smoking and failing to quit despite knowledge of the dangers. In
modified comparative states, which are the majority of United
States jurisdictions, there may be a large number of zero verdicts
because the juries will find the plaintiffs conduct to be more than
Ex ante, it is difficult to
half the fault involved in the injury.'
determine which cases these will be and, so, particular plaintiffs
and their attorneys may be very reluctant to incur the costs of
individual litigation.'5 5 Of course, those potential plaintiffs who feel
that they would do better in a fully individual proceeding should opt
out of any class action when they receive notice of it.
The alternative of allowing no class action litigation at all is itself
an interesting one. What if the representatives of each of the
400,000 Americans that tobacco kills each year 5 6 were to sue
individually? As noted, the strength of the comparative negligence
defense makes this event unlikely, but something resembling it is
still within the realm of possibility. If, unlike asbestos litigation,
mass accident cases and some other toxic torts,15 7 the litigation is
evenly spread throughout the United States rather than concentrated in more limited areas, the court systems of the states might
well be able to absorb the cases, albeit at a greater expenditure of
resources than they might like. Whether the potential defendants
could afford to defend that many individual suits is another matter.
Some cases would inevitably get to trial or significant pretrial

154 See W. PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSERAND KEETON ONTHE LAW OFTORTS § 67, at 473

& nn.39-40 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing modified comparative negligence and listing states that

have adopted it).
'" One alternative to a class action that might save some costs is to use offensive
preclusion, keeping the same defendant from relitigating issues over and over. This strategy
has not been successful in the asbestos litigation, however, and it is unlikely to succeed in
tobacco, where there have been far fewer pro-plaintiff decisions. See Michael D. Green, The
Inability of Offensive CollateralEstoppel to FulfillIts Promise: An Examinationof Estoppel
in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141, 172-78 (1984) (noting that courts have refused
to apply collateral estoppel in asbestos cases, frequently citing disuniformity of results in
previous cases).
16 See supra text accompanying note 6 (giving statistic for annual tobacco-related
deaths).
157 Mass product injury cases tend to cluster in particular districts, often overwhelming
the dockets in those locations. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation:
Findingsfrom the Institute for Civil Justice'sResearch, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 495-96 (1987)
(noting that occupational exposure and other factors cause geographic concentration of
filings).
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proceedings, even if the trial queue in some locations grew uncontrollably. One suspects that if that event occurs, even the defenmechanism to handle the
dants might begin to search for some
158
fashion.
consolidated
a
in
litigation
B. PARTICIPATION CONCERNS FOR PLAINTIFF CLASS MEMBERS

Class action procedure is a solution to the problem of litigation
costs that carries its own problems, including those of loss of control
over the claim by individual claimants, with a decrease in the ability
to participate in the judicial process. There are also problems and
risks associated with conflicting interests between class action
lawyers and claimants with respect to settlement. Nevertheless,
these problems are not insurmountable.
Large-scale proceedings such as class actions cause individual
claimants to lose control over their claims, as the choice of pretrial
and trial strategy is handed over to the class representatives and
their lawyers.1 59 Participation and control are important rights of
a litigant in a fair judicial system.1 6 Nevertheless, participation

One possibility is an administrative compensation scheme, perhaps one funded by the
tobacco companies but under government control, similar to the Black Lung program
administered by the Social Security System and paid for by the coal mine operators. See
generallyPaul A. LeBel, Beginning the Endgama" The Search for an Injury Compensation
System Alternative to Tort Liability for Tobacco-RelatedHarms, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 457 (1997)
(discussing goals, essential elements, and recommended contours of alternative compensation
system for tobacco-related injuries); sources cited supranote 8 (discussing various regulatory
options for tobacco). On the general topic of administrative compensation plans for mass
torts, see Richard A. Nagareda, Turningfrom Tort to Administration,94 MICH. L. REV. 899
(1996); Jack B. Weinstein, EthicalDilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469,
564-67 (1994). For discussion regarding the Black Lung compensation program, see generally
Allen R. Prunty & Mark E. Solomons, The FederalBlack Lung Program: Its Evolution and
Current Issues, 91 W VA. L. REV. 665 (1989) and Rita A. Massie, Note, Modification of
Benefits for Claimantsunder the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program,97 W. VA. L. REV.
1023 (1995).
5' See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent,1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 69, 74-76, 82-86 (explaining traditional justifications for individual claim autonomy and
noting other drawbacks of mass trial proceedings).
'" See, e.g., Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretionover Competing
Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 284 (1991) (noting that "the right to
personally select litigation strategies" is "crucial to fair procedure"); Judith Resnik,
ProceduralInnovations,Sloshing Over: A Comment on DeborahHensler,A Glass Half Full,
a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury
Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1642 (1995) (stating that purposes of due process "may
1'
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and individual control are often lacking even in individual personal
injury litigation.' 6 ' There is no evidence that class proceedings are
necessarily worse, particularly if in later follow-up trials the judge,
jury, or judicial adjunct can hear the individual plaintiff tell his or
her story.162

Moreover, the value that claimants place on participation rights
will vary from individual to individual. Far from desiring participation, some claimants are terrified of the prospect of seeing the
inside of a courtroom. Others value the opportunity to appear, but
value it less than an incremental dollar in the judgment or settlement caused by the massing of claims or pooling of costs. If the
class includes only those individuals who are likely to appreciate the
importance of the decision to remain in the class or to opt out when
they receive notice (in other words, probably only those who are
currently suffering some manifest injury from smoking), and the
notice those persons receive is clear and understandable, any loss of
participation among the persons who decide to stay in the suit
should not be of concern to the judicial system.
There exist real difficulties with some class attorneys who settle
class actions cheaply in order to maximize the value of their own
time on the case.163 Existing safeguards 164 may solve some of these

include dignifying individuals, enabling participation, giving notice to litigants' views, and
effectuating outcomes").
'G See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, ResolvingMass Toxic Torts: Myths andRealities, 1989
U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 92-100 (discussing empirical study of tort litigants' interaction with their
attorneys and their perceptions of control over their cases).
162 See id. at 99-100 (citing uses of fairness hearings, evaluation conferences, claimant
hearings, and open-court explanation of settlement plan as providing opportunities for class
member participation in litigation); see also McGovern, supra note 42, at 693-94 (discussing
advantages of"hybrid litigation-administrative format" for processing individual claims once
common issues have been decided in consolidated proceedings).
163 See, e.g., Coffee, supranote 59, at 1367-1384 (discussing collusive agreements between
defendants and plaintiffs' attorneys for lower settlements in exchange for higher attorneys'
fees); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for PrivateEnforcement of Law Through Class and DerivativeActions, 86
CoLUM.L. REV. 669,714-20 (1986) (arguing that principal-agent relationship makes class and
derivative actions particularly susceptible to collusion between defendants and plaintiffs'
attorneys); Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why ClassActions (May) Settlefor Too Little,
48 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1997) (discussing danger that class counsel may settle class actions for
less than their expected trial value due to principal-agent relationship and attorney fee
structure for class actions); John Leubsdorf, Co-optingthe ClassAction, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1222, 1225 (1995) (suggesting that defense counsel may offer attractive fee settlements to
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problems, though they must be aggressively enforced to be effective.
The preferred approach, however, would be to add to existing
safeguards the right of each class member to decide individually to
accept or reject any proposed settlement.'6 5
C. FAIRNESS FOR DEFENDANTS

The existence of class actions in the states can be expected to
confer two benefits on plaintiffs: They will be able to pool costs, and
their cases will, with respect to those issues on which the class
action proceeds to trial, actually get to trial. Had the procedure not
been available, costs would keep some plaintiffs from suing, and the
prospect of the costs would have induced others to settle more
cheaply. The likelihood of a queue for trial if all cases were brought
individually would have the same effects. Neither the pooling of the
costs nor the circumvention of the queue is unfair to the tobacco
defendants, however.
The pooling of costs simply means that more of the individuals
the defendants have wronged will be able to obtain redress. It does
not confer rights to redress on those whose claims are invalid. It
enriches the claims of those who would otherwise have to pay
duplicative costs and provides an avenue for claims for which the
costs might exceed the recoveries. Giving those claims a chance to
be heard is one of the most important contributions that the class
action suit makes to furthering justice. 6 ' If the scope of liability is
accordingly increased, that is all to the good.
class counsel so they will persuade class members to settle for less).
'" These safeguards include the adequate-representation standard and court-approvalof-settlement requirements of Federal Rule 23(a) and (e), and their state-law analogues.
'" Weber, supranote 62, at 1193-1213.
" See Amchem Prcds., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2246 (1997) (stating that drafters
of Rule 23(b)(3) had "dominantly in mind vindication of 'the rights of groups of people who
individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all"'
(quoting Benjamin Kaplan, chair of the advisory committee that drafted the rule, in A
PrefatoryNote 10 B.C INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497,497 (1969))); Castano v. American Tobacco
Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (describing ability to sue when costs would otherwise
exceed gains as the "most compelling rationale for finding superiority in a class action");
Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The ContemporaryFunctionof the Class Suit, 8 U.
CHI. L. REV. 684,684-6 (1941) (suggesting that class action procedure facilitates legal redress
by assisting individuals who are uninformed regarding corporate complexities and whose
individual injuries would not warrant expenditure of litigation costs).
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A class action also has the effect of bringing all cases to the head
of the line for trial, solving problems with queuing for trial time
when a glut of cases occurs. Whether this advantage will prove
significant in tobacco litigation is uncertain, for no glut of cases has
yet occurred. The defendants might, of course, wish to exploit the
trial delays that a large number of filings might cause. In the
absence of prejudgment interest, delays reduce the real value of
judgments and decrease settlements. 6 7 Nevertheless, it is hard to
find a legitimate interest in the defendants' practical advantage
from delay.
D. BENEFITS OF HAVING LOCAL FORUMS DETERMINE UNDERLYING
ISSUES IN TOBACCO LIABILITY

If state court class actions go forward, state, as opposed to
federal, decisionmakers will determine which legal rules should
govern tobacco tort liability. The ability of states to determine such
matters as tort law furthers important ends of democracy in a
federal republic.16 The variety of tort law rules now found in the

'77 See HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT 128 (2d ed. 1978) (suggesting that
computing interest from commencement of suit would increase settlement amounts).
168

This discussion may appear somewhat one-sided because it does not consider the

comparative advantages from a federal legislative or judicial solution. Although I recognize
the peril of experiments that lack a control group, it appears that there has been a voluntary
decision not to participate in the experiment, as far as tobacco is concerned, bath by Congress
and by the federal judiciary, at least with respect to mass proceedings. General considerations about the desirability of federal judicial or congressional development of a law of mass
torts are discussed in Weber, supranote 69, at 224-53 (concluding that federal legislative and
judicial processes are inappropriate for the purpose and that federal judicial resources are
better spent elsewhere). Congressional development of toxic tort law could be accompanied
by a federal administrative compensation scheme. See, e.g., LeBel, supranote 158 (discussing
goals and recommended contours of alternative compensation system for tobacco-related
injuries). Though such a plan might be cheaper to carry out than judicial relief, it carries the
dual disadvantages of federal development of the law and the risk of capture of the agency
by the repeat-player defendants. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive PoliticalDimensions
of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 28-29 (1994) (describing regulated interests'
manipulation of regulatory processes); see also Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its
Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 722 (1994) (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)) (suggesting that low public visibility may result in agencies
acting to benefit special interests). Moreover, the plaintiffs in the tobacco cases are
contending that the companies willfully concealed information about the risk of death,
manipulated nicotine levels to keep smokers hooked, and deliberately promoted illegal sales
of cigarettes to teenagers. See Transcript of the Florida Tobacco Litigation Syntpo.
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states reflect state and regional variations in how the public and
their representatives-legislatures and elected judges-feel about
issues of personal responsibility and economic and social regulation."6 9 A national approach would mute these differences and
frustrate the exercise of local choice. Even a federal court's guess
about these matters would be one remove, or more, away from the
people of the state than would the decision of state judges who must
stand for reelection, or whose appointers have to do so. 7 '
It is also true that having a variety of state law tort rules
authoritatively applied to the similar facts of tobacco exposure will
provide valuable information about the consequences of imposing
various rules of liability. Justice Brandeis described the states as
laboratories of democracy in which different jurisdictions adopt
differing rules of law and the citizens of other states and the nation
at large can observe the rules' effects."' If multiple statewide

sium-Fact,Law, Polio,and Significance,25 FLA ST. U. L. REV. 737,786-88 (1998) (remarks
of J. Anderson Berly) (discussing internal documents of some tobacco companies).
Administrative resolution of complaints over this conduct would seem as inappropriate as
handling a complaint of serious crime through a mediation system. See Albert W. Alschuler,
Mediation with aMugger: The ShortageofAdjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier
Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1808-10 (1986) (describing misuse of
informal processes in criminal justice system).
"' See Weber, supra note 69, at 236-45 (arguing nationalizing mass tort law would be
mistake because of advantages of divergent state laws).
'"" See id. at 224-35. Already, a number of courts have passed on state law issues
pertinent to tobacco liability when adjudicating individual smokers' actions. Because either
the plaintiffs preferred to bring the cases in federal court or the actions were subject to
removal, however, the decisionmakers have mostly been federal. See, e.g., Allgood v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying liability under Texas law for
failure to establish reliance); Jones v. American Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 706 (N.D. Ohio
1998) (dismissing products liability claims under Ohio statute but denying motion to dismiss
on common law fraud and conspiracy claims); Tompkin v. American Brands, Inc., 10 F. Supp.
2d 895 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (granting summary judgment under state law for products liability
and related claims); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Kan. 1995)
(permitting action to proceed on failure to warn and fraudulent concealment claims). In
addition to the class actions cited supra notes 117-120, an individual's state case has been
permitted to go forward, obtaining several authoritative determinations about the
applicability of the state's tort law to tobacco injuries. See American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell,
951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997) (barring tort claims based on design defect, warning, and other
theories but permitting claims for marketing defect related to addictive qualities of tobacco
and manufacturing defect over pesticide residue).
'' See New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262,311(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
C'It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.").
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tobacco class actions appear, the citizens of the nation will witness
the effects of contrasting rules on a number of important issues, all
applied to the same basic facts of tobacco marketing and consumption.
In addition to the issue of reliance on misrepresentations,
discussed above, there are several important tort issues on which
states may develop the law that reflects the view of their people and
learn about the effects of different rules. They include: (1) whether
products liability exists for a dangerous defect even when an
adequate warning is given; (2) whether the assumption of risk
defense should be assimilated into comparative negligence defenses;
and (3) whether, and in what fashion, market-share liability may be
imposed in a mass toxic tort. Substantial controversy exists on each
of the issues, and states' views on them reflect the states' own
assessments of how personal and corporate responsibility relate to
civil liability.
1. The Significance of Failureto Warn. Some states17 2 follow a
comment in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which generally
establishes that a product is not defective if the warnings provided
are adequate and the product is safe when the warnings are
followed.173 Other states, either on their own or following the black
letter and comments of the new Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, adhere to the view that product defects and
failure to warn are separate heads of liability, 7 4 and that the
defendant may be liable for an unreasonably dangerous product,

,72 See, e.g., Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 450 A.2d 615, 619 (Pa. 1982) (holding that injury
was not caused by allegedly defective warnings accompanying air rifle because instructions
were not read or followed); Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 454 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Iln. App. Ct.
1983) (finding that lawn mower operator's conduct in ignoring warnings relieved
manufacturer of liability for alleged design defect).
173 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965) ("Where warning is
given,
the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such
a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous.").
174 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (CA product
is
defective when.., it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective
because of inadequate instructions or warnings.").
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even when the warning was adequate. 175 Any failure to follow the
warning might give rise to a comparative negligence or other
defense but it would not bar liability. 1 6
The controversy relates directly to tobacco products, for cigarette
packages and advertising have carried warnings for years. States
following the old Restatement may deny product defect liability,
relying on the adequacy of the warnings. 177 States that follow the
new Restatement or similar approaches would leave the avenue of
products liability open.
Which rule the state adopts reflects that state's view about
personal responsibility, as opposed to manufacturer responsibility,
for the use and sale of a dangerous product. Judges in state courts
are representatives of their locales and typically are elected by
district or statewide electorates. If they respond to their constituents, the new Restatement's approach will prevail in those parts of
the country where people sympathize with individuals who take
risks in disregard of warnings and who feel that the responsibility
of the individual in that case is not so great as to foreclose recovery.
The older approach will continue in those areas where the people
wish to impose on individuals all the consequences of their personal
decisions. Voters in the nation at large will witness the effects of
the two approaches. When and where legislative action is contemplated, legislators will have the benefit of the states' experience with
the different rules.
2. Assumption of Risk and ComparativeNegligence. Most courts
apply comparative negligence doctrine to products liability cases,
but states diverge on whether to apply pure comparative negligence,
equal-fault comparative negligence, or greater-fault comparative
"' See Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that
"warnings alone will [not] necessarily save a product from being unreasonably dangerous");
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 336-37 (Tex. 1998) (citing new
Restatement with approval and holding that "warnings and safer alternative designs are
factors ...in determining whether the product as designed is reasonably safe"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. 1 fCWarnings are not.., a substitute
for the provision of a reasonably safe design."). Preemption may also be a barrier to some
cases based on inadequate warnings. See supra note 79 (discussing preemption).
'76 For a general discussion of the effects of the new provision in the states, see Hope
Viner Samborn, ManufacturerBeware, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 30.
177 Liability may still exist under fraud, misrepresentation, or other theories, of course.
See supra note 170 (describing theories of various tobacco cases).
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negligence.' 8 They also differ on whether and how assumption of
risk 179 is merged into comparative negligence or whether it is a
separate and absolute defense to liability.'
The state's choice of doctrines has an obvious impact on the
likelihood and scope of tobacco liability. If the choice to smoke is
viewed as assumption of the risk or contributory negligence, and
that conduct is a complete defense, recovery is out of reach. On the
other hand, smoking that is considered comparative fault will
merely reduce damages. In pure comparative negligence states,
recovery of some amount would be highly likely. The odds will
diminish somewhat in the modified comparative negligence states,
but some large recoveries are still likely.
The choice of rules regarding comparative negligence again
implicates important issues about personal responsibility. One
commentator has noted the moral attraction of a position that
assigns some responsibility to the smoker but discounts the fault on
account of the early age at which smokers become addicted and the
misleading conduct of the tobacco companies with regard to
information about smoking's hazards. 8 ' Comparative negligence
doctrine allows juries to put that position into practice.'8 2

PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17 cmt. b (1998).

For
explanation of the differences among pure comparative negligence, equal-fault comparative
negligence, and greater-fault comparative negligence, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 154,
§ 67, at 471-74.
179 See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 154, § 68 (discussing defense
of assumption of
risk).
"s Most states assimilate assumption of risk into the comparative negligence defense in
products cases. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 293 (Fla. 1977) (merging
178 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:

doctrines); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17 cmt. d (1998)

(noting that majority view considers "all forms of plaintiffs failure to conform to applicable
standards of care," such as assumption of risk and contributory or comparative negligence);
KEETONETAL., supranote 156, § 68, at 495-98 (discussing relationship between comparative
negligence and assumption of risk defenses). Alabama applies a contributory negligence
defense to some forms of products liability. See Culpepper v. Weihrauch, 991 F. Supp. 1397,
1400 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (allowing contributory negligence defense for misuse of product).
181 See Cupp, supranote 75, at 485-98 (discussing how issues, such as youth, advertising,
deception, and addiction may affect assumption of risk or contributory negligence defenses);
see also Robert L. Rabin, A SociolegalHistory of the Tobacco Tort Litigation,44 STAN. L. REV.
853 (1992) (describing moral concerns in assigning tobacco liability). A stomach-turning
account of tobacco companies' manipulation of information is found in GLANTz, supra note 6.
18' See Cupp, supra note 75, at 503-06 (discussing possible approaches to addiction and
comparative negligence).
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That view is not necessarily shared by the entire country,
however. State-by-state decisions on matters of personal responsibility express the divergent views that may control. Perhaps, over
time, nationwide views on personal responsibility will converge. If
so, cases decided under the diverse law that has developed during
that time will supply the electorate with useful data about the exact
results of the variations on the comparative negligence approach.
3. Market-Share Liability. States also have diverse approaches
to whether and when it is appropriate to allocate liability for a
defective product to all makers of the product according to market
share.'8 3 Market-share liability could be a matter of considerable
importance in actions in which the plaintiffs cannot prevail on
conspiracy or joint action theories that would confer joint and
several liability on all the various tobacco manufacturers. Smokers
who switch brands and individuals harmed by second-hand smoke
could have their entire ability to recover depend on the court's
adoption of a market-share theory. If one or more of the manufacturers goes bankrupt and the conspiracy and joint-action theories
fail, availability of a market-share theory will be of key importance
to many plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, market-share ideas are a departure from traditional ideas of tort liability. Some courts reject them for that reason
alone;18 4 others have circumscribed their operation.'8 5 Again,
decisions about morality are involved: whether it is fair to allocate
damages based on a form of collective contribution even if the
defendants cannot be shown to have acted together. Collective
responsibility ideas, like individual responsibility notions, vary from
region to region and locality to locality. Local majorities should
have the ability to weigh in on the matter. The results of their
legislative or judicial representatives' decisions will provide useful

i' Compare Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So.2d 275, 286 (Fla.1990), Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (adopting various forms of market-share
liability), and Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937-38 (Cal. 1980), with Smith v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 337 (111. 1990) (rejecting market-share liability).
I" See, e.g., Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 337 (rejecting market-share liability because it "is too

great a deviation from... existing tort principles").
'" See, e.g., Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691,700-01 (Ohio 1987)

(refusing to extend theory to asbestos products when type and percentage of asbestos in
product varied widely).
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information, particularly if a national solution ultimately appears
advisable on how to deal with injuries from second-hand smoke.
IV. CONCLUSION

The state courts are the neglected option in most discussions of
complex litigation. Class action proceedings in those courts,
however, may emerge as the most sensible way in which to apply
the law of tort to injuries from exposure to tobacco. If limits are
imposed on the classes and safeguards for class members are
carefully followed, state class proceedings might administer justice
highly effectively. The administration of justice by state courts will
permit the decisionmakers who are closest to the people, and
sensitive to local and regional differences among the people to
develop legal rules that are most appropriately applied to tobacco
injuries in their jurisdictions.

